Hungary’s conundrum: undoing Orbán – without becoming Orbán 

I was in Budapest for the extraordinary election weekend.

There was the party, the elation, the hope, once Victor Orbán conceded defeat.

But for the people I was with, activists and human rights defenders, there was also bitterness. For 16 years the government of their own country attacked them, vilified them and pressured them with legal procedures. 

The mobilisation for Péter Magyar was immense, turnout reached almost 80 percent. Many people saw him as the only chance to break up the semi-authoritarian and highly corrupt Fidesz-state.

Can he fulfill their hopes and will the EU help or hinder him?

Magyar’s Tisza party has won 141 of 199 seats in parliament. That is well beyond the two-thirds majority needed to change the constitution, giving him a comfortable cushion against any defections. The two-thirds majority is, however, more of a necessary rather than a sufficient condition to change the state. 

Why?

Because Fidesz has constructed a very elaborate system of checks and balances that never checked Orban’s executive power, but is now ready to snap into action.

Court president until 2037?

The Constitutional Court is filled with Fidesz loyalists who will serve very long terms.

Take its president, Péter Polt. He is a co-founder of Fidesz and was just elected last year for a term lasting until 2037. The court could annul any reforms the government tries to enact. 

Magyar called on these office holders to resign, to make space for reforms. If this was a normal transfer of democratic power, such a call would be scandalous.

But this is a transition from semi-authoritarianism in which all the institutions were aligned with Fidesz (if you want more details on how public broadcasters served as Fidesz propaganda channels and how the Election Commission ruled in favour of Fidesz, consult the findings by the OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission). 

Some people believe that psychology will overcome these political problems. People will adjust to new realities and not obstruct a very popular government, so the thinking goes.

That may be the case. But hardcore Fidesz loyalists have a lot to lose and may derive some hope from the fact that, despite losing, the party gained almost 40 percent of the votes. 

Bending the law?

If the institutions play hardball, Tisza may be pushed into the uncomfortable challenge of bending the rule of law to build a real rule of law.

By doing so, it could look like Fidesz in 2010. At that time, the party changed the set-up of state institutions to gain full control over them. Among myriad legal and bureaucratic measures, it lowered the retirement age of judges from 70 years to 62 years.

By this simple manoeuvre, it forced 274 judges out of their jobs (last year, now with its own judges in office and its political position becoming weaker, it increased the retirement age back to 70).  

What should Tisza do, to avoid looking like Fidesz in 2010?

I think three points are essential here: First, Tisza should always make clear that it received a mandate for system change.