Orban’s motive for clashing with the EU and Ukraine over the halt in oil through the Druzhba pipeline is clear. Less understandable is why Fico is following him into a confrontation where the long-term stakes are alarmingly high.
Tim Gosling
Michal Vasecka of the Bratislava Policy Institute points out that causing trouble in Brussels is a way to secure EU help in solving these issues. “Fico’s strategy aligns with well-documented patterns of member states aimed at extracting financial, regulatory and political rents,” he argues.
In other words, just as was the case with last year’s veto of the EU sanctions package, Fico hopes to use the Druzhba fight to win concessions on energy prices, state aid or climate regulations.
At the same time, Fico is able to claim to supporters that he’s fighting against EU regulations that are contributing to their struggles. “We must forget the green nonsense that is holding back our industry and economy,” the Slovak prime minister said on public radio recently – an oft-repeated message.
Vasecka says this is another ruse. Despite Fico claiming the EU is becoming an authoritarian force that intrudes on national sovereignty, “the core instruments of energy pricing, taxation and household compensation remain largely under national control.”
Fighting Brussels and showing support for Russian narratives, even if not openly declared, offers a more fundamental political gain, say analysts.
“There are many voters in Slovakia who have a positive perception of Russia,” Stefanik points out. “This cohort tends to view liberal democracy as a threat to national identity, believe in conspiracy theories and to be critical of the EU.”
“Everything Fico does in foreign policy, the addressee is his electorate: the 30 per cent or so of Slovaks that are anti-system,” insists Alexander Duleba of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association. “In order to stay in power, he has subordinated Slovakia’s foreign interests to this fight. He has to be seen to be in conflict with the EU, with Zelensky.”
At an even more rudimentary level, analysts suggest the Slovak prime minister, aware that his nominally left-leaning Smer party is falling in the polls, is seeking to shore up his political capital ahead of Slovakia’s own elections set for next year.
“Fico is closely watching the Hungarian election, and the support Orban is getting from both Russia and the United States,” Duleba continues. “It’s very likely, should Orban win, that next year’s elections in Slovakia would follow a similar model. Should Orban lose, Fico knows he’ll suffer the same fate.”
Stefanik sees a similar scenario. “It could be speculated,” he says, “that Fico hopes Moscow will help him influence the outcome of the vote next year.”
It wouldn’t be the first time. Investigations have revealed that Orban’s long-serving foreign minister, Peter Szijjarto, helped secure a high-profile visit to Moscow for Peter Pellegrini, Fico’s protégé and now Slovakia’s president, in a bid to boost his fortunes ahead of the general election in 2020.
There’s further speculation in Slovak opposition circles of a more mundane and direct advantage for the 61-year-old prime minister; namely, that he has personal financial interests in businesses linked to Russian energy imports.
Again, the government office did not respond when asked to comment on these claims, which remain unsubstantiated.
